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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALARCON, Circuit Judge. 
 
Frederick Urban appeals from the judgment of conviction 
for possession of an unregistered destructive device in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. SS 5841, 5861(d), and 5971. He 
contends that the district court committed prejudicial error 
in refusing to instruct the jury that the intent to use the 
components as a weapon is an element of the crime 
charged in the indictment. Urban also argues that the 
district court erred as a matter of law in applying the 
special skill enhancement under United States Sentencing 
Guideline S 3B1.3 ("S 3B1.3"). We affirm the judgment of 
conviction because we conclude that the district court 
properly instructed the jury. We also determine that the 
district court properly applied a two-level sentence 
enhancement for the use of a special skill in a manner that 




In late 1994, Frederick Urban ("Urban") began to frequent 
a local gun store owned by Patrick Moreton. Urban gave 
Moreton a number of pamphlets entitled "1-2-3-4 Easy 
Made C-4" to sell on a consignment basis. Urban claimed to 
have written the pamphlet, which set forth directions on 
how to manufacture triacetonetriperoxide ("TATP"), an 
extremely volatile explosive. Urban continued to visit the 
store, and to discuss his ideas about manufacturing 
explosives. In early April, Urban met with Moreton's father, 
John, to discuss the possibility of building an aluminum 
"grenade-type launcher." Urban told the elder Moreton that 
he had a cache of TATP buried in his backyard. 
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Unbeknownst to Urban, John Moreton was an informant 
for the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the 
Department of the Treasury ("ATF"). John Moreton informed 
Kevin Simpson, an ATF agent, of Urban's activities, and the 
ATF set up a sting operation. 
 
In his discussions with John Moreton, Urban stated that 
TATP could breach a three-inch steel plate. The two 
arranged to meet and test the explosive power of TATP. On 
April 11, 1995, Urban and Moreton met in the parking lot 
of a highway rest stop. ATF agents arrested Urban when he 
removed a large ammunition box from his van and placed 
it in the trunk of Moreton's car. The ammunition box 
contained two large canisters, a homemade metal 
detonator, two large bags of an explosive later designated as 
TATP, two carbon dioxide cartridges, a coil of pyrotechnic 
fuse, and a steel pipe. 
 
During a search of Urban's residence, ATF agents seized 
books and pamphlets on how to manufacture various 
weapons and explosives, a polyvinyl chloride ("PVC") 
container, a five-inch length of 3/32 fuse, an illegal firearm 
silencer, a partially filled container of smokeless gun 
powder, a homemade detonator, and three fuse assemblies. 
Urban was arrested and charged with the possession of an 
unregistered destructive device in violation of 
26 U.S.C. S 5861(d). On April 18, 1995, Urban was indicted 
on one count of possession of an unregistered destructive 
device. 
 
Urban was found guilty after a trial by jury. He has 
timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and the 




Urban argues that we must reverse because the district 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential 
element of the crime of possession of the components of an 
unregistered destructive device. He contends that the trial 
court was required to instruct the jury that the Government 
had the burden of producing evidence that he intended to 
use the components of an unregistered destructive device 
as a weapon. This court conducts a plenary review of a 
 
                                3 
  
challenge to a district court's instruction to the jury 
regarding the applicable law. United States v. Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d 1252, 1260 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067 
(1995). 
 
The question whether the Government has the burden of 
producing evidence and persuading the jury that the 
accused possessed the components of an unregistered 
destructive device with the intent to use them as a weapon 
presents an issue of first impression in this circuit. 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the language used 
by Congress in creating the offense of possession of an 
unregistered firearm. Section 5861(d) of the National 
Firearms Act provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person . . . to . . . possess afirearm which 
is not registered to him in the National Firearms 
Registration and Transfer Record." 26 U.S.C. S 5861(d). 
Section 5861(d) makes no reference to the intent of the 
person in possession of an unregistered firearm. 
 
Section 5845(f) defines the term "firearm" inter alia, as a 
"destructive device." A destructive device is defined in 
S 5845(f) as follows: 
 
       (1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, 
       (B) grenade, (C) rocket having a propellant charge of 
       more than four ounces, (D) missile having an explosive 
       or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, 
       (E) mine, or (F) similar device; 
 
       (2) any type of weapon by whatever name known which 
       will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a 
       projectile by the action of an explosive or other 
       propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of 
       more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun 
       or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally 
       recognized as particularly suitable for sporting 
       purposes; and 
 
       (3) any combination of parts either designed or intended 
       for use in converting any device into a destructive 
       device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) and 
       from which a destructive device may be readily 
       assembled. The term "destructive device" shall not 
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       include any device which is neither designed nor 
       redesigned for use as a weapon . . .. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 5845(f) (emphasis added). 
 
The terms "designed" and "intended" as used in 
S 5845(f)(3) are separated by the disjunctive word "or." 
"[C]anons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms 
connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings 
unless the context dictates otherwise." United States v. 
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 
(1979)). "Simply stated, a device may be `converted' into a 
destructive device as defined in Subparagraphs (1) and (2) 
by way of `design or intent.' " United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 
892, 894 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 935 (1972) 
(citation omitted). Thus, looking solely at the plain meaning 
of the words used by Congress, a person may be found 
guilty of a violation of S 5861(d) if he or she is in possession 
of a combination of parts designed for use in converting any 
device into a destructive device, or if he or she is in 
possession of a combination of parts intended for use in 
converting any device into a destructive device. 
 
Urban asks that we construe the language of the statute 
as requiring, in all cases where the prosecution is based on 
the possession of the components of an unregistered 
destructive device, that the jury must be instructed that the 
Government has the burden of persuading it that the 
defendant intended to use the components as a weapon. 
His reliance on United States v. Fredman, 833 F.2d 837 
(9th Cir. 1987), United States v. Morningstar, 456 F.2d 278 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972), and United 
States v. Curtis, 520 F.2d 1300 (1st Cir. 1971) for this 
sweeping proposition is misplaced. 
 
In Fredman, police officers seized two bundles of 
commercial detonator cord, three commercial detonator 
fuses, and two commercial igniters in a search of the 
defendant's home. Id. at 837-38. Fredman was indicted for 
possession of an unregistered firearm. Id. at 838. 
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction. 
The court held in Fredman that, "mere components of 
commercial explosives, absent proof of intent to use such 
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components as a weapon, fail to qualify as a `destructive 
device' within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. S 5845. Intent is a 
necessary element absent proof of original design or 
redesign for use as a weapon." Id. at 839 (emphasis added).1 
The court concluded that the components were not 
designed for use as a weapon "since it is admitted that the 
seized explosive components are designed for use as 
commercial blasting components." Id. Fredman establishes 
that intent to use the components as a weapon is a 
required element when the components are commercial in 
nature and are not designed or redesigned for use as a 
weapon. 
 
In United States v. Morningstar, 456 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 
1972), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's 
dismissal of an indictment charging the defendant with 
possession of a destructive device. The device in 
Morningstar consisted of four sticks of commercial black 
powder pellet taped together and several unattached 
blasting caps. Id. at 279-280. In reversing the district 
court's ruling that commercial explosives are not covered 
under S 5861(d), the Morningstar court held that 
"explosives, such as commercial black powder or dynamite, 
are subject to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act and the National Firearms Act depending on their 
intended use." Id. at 281. The court also opined that 
"explosive and incendiary devices which have no business 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Urban suggests that we adopt the principle set forth in the Ninth 
Circuit's Jury Instruction 9.05B which provides in pertinent part that 
"[i]n order for the defendant to be found guilty . . . the government must 
prove . . . the defendant intended to use the components as a weapon." 
9th CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9.05B (1995). In the comment to Jury 
Instruction 9.05B the jury instruction committee cited United States v. 
Fredman for the proposition that "[f]or unassembled components to 
qualify as a `firearm' there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the components were intended for use as a weapon." This commentary 
ignores the fact that in the Fredman case the components were designed 
to be used for commercial blasting and not as a weapon. The rule set 
forth in Instruction 9.05B does not accurately reflect the Ninth Circuit's 
construction of S 5845(f)(3) in Fredman. We are also mindful of the 
principle that pattern jury instructions from other circuits are not 
binding authority. See United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
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or industrial utility . . . are covered regardless of their 
intended use." Id. at 280. Morningstar, like Fredman, reads 
S 5845(f) to include commercial explosive components when 
the prosecution is able to prove the defendant's intent to 
use the assembled device as a weapon, rather than for its 
legitimate, commercial purpose. 
 
In United States v. Curtis, 520 F.2d 1300 (1st Cir. 1975), 
the defendants were prosecuted in separate counts for 
possessing two destructive devices. One device consisted of 
five sticks of dynamite bound together with a fuse attached. 
The other device consisted of eight to ten sticks of dynamite 
bound together and attached to a black box and a timer. Id. 
at 1301. As was the case in Morningstar, the defendants in 
Curtis argued that commercial explosives are not a 
destructive device within the meaning of S 5845(f). Id. at 
1302. 
 
The First Circuit held that "the government's evidence 
with regard to the smaller device was not sufficient to 
support a conclusion that the object was anything more 
than `the familiar industrial blasting charge.' " Id. at 1303 
(citation omitted). In so ruling, the court recognized "the 
line of cases holding that a dynamite charge may become a 
destructive device if intended for use as a bomb." Id. 
 
What distinguishes the cases cited by Urban from the 
instant case is the lack of ambiguity here as to the nature 
of the assembled device. In Fredman, Morningstar, and 
Curtis, the courts were determining whether a device 
utilizing commercial explosives constituted a destructive 
device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of S 5845(f). 
These cases concluded that such devices may fall within 
the statutory definition of a destructive device when the 
prosecution demonstrates the defendant's intent to use the 
assembled device as a weapon. By contrast, there is no 
doubt that the components possessed by Urban were 
designed to create a canister grenade -- a device clearly 
regulated as a destructive device under S 5845(f)(1). 
 
A pamphlet seized at Urban's home described the process 
of converting an ordinary carbon dioxide ("CO2") cartridge 
into a fragmenting canister grenade. The pamphlet included 
detailed instructions and drawings on how to construct 
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such a grenade. The process involves the widening of the 
cartridge opening to allow the introduction of a pyrotechnic 
fuse and the scoring of the cartridge body to maximize 
fragmentation. CO2 cartridges are generally designed for 
use in BB guns, toy racing cars, and seltzer water 
dispensers. The cartridges found in Urban's possession had 
been redesigned with serrated walls and widened openings 
inconsistent with a CO2 cartridge's legitimate uses. 
 
The pamphlet recommends the use of a high powered 
explosive in canister grenades for greater damage, rather 
than commercially used explosives such as black powder. 
One of the cartridges found in the ammunition box seized 
from Urban's vehicle contained TATP. The ammunition box 
also contained two large bags of TATP. A Government 
expert testified that because TATP is "so unstable" and 
"stores poorly," it has "never found any commercial use at 
all." 
 
Section 5845(f)(3) limits its application to "any 
combination of parts designed or intended for use in 
converting any device into a constructive device as defined 
in subparagraphs (1) and (2)." The definition of a 
destructive device in subparagraph (1) includes a grenade. 
Here, the evidence is uncontradicted that Urban was in 
possession of a combination of parts expressly designed to 
create a canister grenade. Intent to use the components as 
a weapon (to assemble them into a device to be used as a 
weapon) is irrelevant when the parts are clearly designed to 
be used in constructing a device which is specifically 
regulated by S 5845(f)(1) or (2). We agree with the Second 
Circuit's construction of S 5845(f)(3) in United States v. 
Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110 (2nd Cir. 1972). "When it is clear 
that the assembled device created by combining the 
components falls within (1) or (2), intent is irrelevant, for 
the parts are clearly `designed' to convert the device into a 
destructive device." Id. at 1119. We hold, therefore, that the 
district court did not err in ruling that it is not necessary 
to instruct the jury that the defendant intended to use the 
components as a weapon when, as here, it is undisputed 
that the parts were clearly designed to create a grenade. 
 




Urban also challenges the district court's sentencing 
decision. He contends that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that a two-level enhancement 
pursuant to S 3B1.3 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines was justified based upon Urban's use of a 
special skill that significantly facilitated the commission of 
the crime of possession of an unregistered destructive device.2 
Urban contends that S 3B1.3 is inapplicable unless there is 
evidence that the defendant received special training or 
education. This court reviews de novo a district court's legal 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. 
Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1996). Because we 
must review the meaning of the term "special skills," and 
"special training and education," we will not defer to the 
district court in construing these words. 
 
The district court explained the basis for its finding that 
Urban possessed and used a special skill in committing a 
violation of S 5861(d) in the following words: 
 
       [W]e find that based on the authorities that have been 
       cited by the probation officer3 in his resolution, that 
       this Defendant had sufficient sophistication to place 
       him in a category of having a special skill. 
 
       By reason of his mechanical background and training, 
       the fact that he authored manuals specifically outlining 
       the manner in which destructive devices could be 
       prepared, and offered these manuals for sale as well as 
       the Defendant's particular interest in the utilization of 
       such devices in the event they were necessary because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Sentencing Guideline S 3B1.3 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
       If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or 
used 
       a special skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the 
       commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels. 
 
3. In the presentence report, the probation officer cited United States v. 
Spencer, 4 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Malgoza, 2 F.3d 
1107 (11th Cir. 1993) for the proposition that "[t]hough the defendant 
did not receive formal training in manufacturing the explosives, several 
circuits have held that the `special skill' does not have to be obtained 
through formal education or training." 
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       of some emergency that might exist even in his own 
       mind or those sympathetic with the Defendant's view 
       about this country. 
 
Thus, the district court concluded that Urban's mechanical 
background and training when considered in light of his 
own research and experimentation were sufficient to 
demonstrate that he possessed a special skill capable of 
facilitating the commission of the crime of possessing an 
unregistered destructive device. 
 
We must determine whether the acquisition of a special 
skill in the construction of a destructive device, such as a 
canister grenade, can be self-taught. Urban maintains that 
an enhancement is appropriate only if the evidence shows 
that the defendant received "substantial education, 
training, or licensing."4 Urban correctly notes that 
Sentencing Guideline S 5H1.2 recognizes that educational 
and vocational skills are ordinarily not relevant in 
calculating the applicable guideline range unless"a 
defendant has misused special training or education to 
facilitate criminal activity." United States Sentencing 
Guideline S 5H1.2. He argues that S 3B1.3 should not be 
applied in fixing his punishment because he never received 
special training or education in the design of canister 
grenades or destructive devices. No evidence was presented 
that Urban received special demolition or explosives 
training from the military or any source. 
 
Urban maintains that this court's decision in United 
States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110 (3rd Cir. 1993) supports 
his contention that he did not misuse special training or 
education. We disagree. 
 
In Hickman, a general contractor was convicted of 
defrauding persons who paid him to construct a house that 
was never built. Id. at 1111. The district court applied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Application No. 2 to Sentencing GuidelineS 3B1.3 reads as follows: 
"Special skills refers to a skill not possessed by members of the general 
public and usually requiring substantial education, training, or 
licensing. Examples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, 
chemists, and demolition experts." United States Sentencing Guidelines 
S 3B1.3 (Application n. 2) (1995). 
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S 3B1.3 because it found that the defendant had used his 
special skill as a contractor in committing fraud. Id. at 
1112-13. This court reversed because it concluded that the 
fact that the defendant possessed a license did not 
demonstrate the defendant's reliance on his training as a 
contractor in perpetrating the fraud. Id. at 1112-13. Unlike 
the historical facts presented to this court in Hickman, it is 
undisputed that Urban used his combined skills and self 
education to design and assemble the components of a 
canister grenade. 
 
The record shows that Urban developed his mechanical 
skills through courses in industrial electronics, 
refrigeration, and air-conditioning at a technical school. He 
applied these skills as the sole owner of a business in 
which he engaged in plumbing, heating, refrigeration, and 
automotive and general repairs. In addition, Urban taught 
himself how to design explosive devices such as canister 
grenades. 
 
During oral argument, Urban's counsel conceded that the 
evidence was sufficient to show that Urban was a "self- 
taught bomb maker." Urban's counsel argued, however, 
that the special skills enhancement contained in S 3B1.3 
did not apply to self-taught skills. He asks that we limit the 
reach of S 3B1.3 to the types of skills expressly identified in 
Application Note 2, each of which requires "substantial 
education, training, or licensing." Section 3B1.3 
(Application n.2) (1995). This argument ignores the use of 
the words "usually requiring" that precede the language 
"substantial education, training, or licensing." The use of 
the word "usually" by the Sentencing Commission 
demonstrates that it did not intend to preclude a trial judge 
from finding, on a case-by-case basis, that a defendant has 
obtained a special skill through life experience and self- 
study. 
 
In United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1993), 
the appellant argued that "he did not demonstrate any 
special skill in his manufacture of methamphetamine 
because he was a self-taught amateur." Id. at 120. In 
rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit reasoned as 
follows: 
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        A special skill is one "usually requiring substantial 
       education, training, or licensing." See U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3, 
       comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). Because the 
       comment adds the word "usually," we find no basis for 
       limiting the increase to only those with formal 
       educations or professional skills. See United States v. 
       Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding 
       that the use of the word "usually" in the note to 
       U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 "implies that substantial training is 
       not a mandatory prerequisite to making a special skills 
       adjustment"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S. Ct. 
       1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 670 (1991). [The appellant] presents 
       the unusual case where factors other than formal 
       education, training, or licensing persuade us that he 




In United States v. Petersen, 98 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1996), 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not 
err in determining that the defendant's computer abilities 
supported a special skills enhancement notwithstanding 
the fact that he had not had "formal training in computers." 
Id. at 506. In United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307 (7th 
Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit upheld the application of 
S 3B1.3 based on the trial court's finding that the 
defendant, an inventor, "had `through life's experiences 
obtained the special ability to tamper with consumer 
products.' " Id. at 191. We agree with our sister circuits that 
a S 3B1.3 sentence enhancement is not limited to persons 
who have received substantial formal education, training 
from experts, or who have been licensed to perform a 
special skill. See also United States v. Malgoza , 2 F.3d 
1107, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hummer, 
916 F.2d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 
The record shows that Urban used his mechanical skills, 
life experience, and self education to invent a method of 
molding the highly unstable TATP into "blocks of explosive 
material." Therefore, we hold that the district court did not 
err as a matter of law in concluding that S 3B1.3 is 
applicable to a person who has developed a special skill 
through self education and his or her work experience and 
uses it to facilitate the commission of a crime. 
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The judgment of conviction and sentence will be affirmed. 
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